Being on the field when the game is still under way. The financial press and stock markets in times of crisis by CASARIN R. & SQUAZZONI F.
1Being on the field when the game is still under way. The
financial press and stock markets in times of crisis
Roberto Casarin1,∗, Flaminio Squazzoni2
1 Department of Economics, University Ca’ Foscari, Venice, Italy
2 Department of Economics and Business, University of Brescia, Brescia, Italy
∗ E-mail: r.casarin@unive.it
Abstract
This paper looks at the relationship between negative news and stock markets in times of global crisis,
such as the 2008/2009 period. We analysed one year of front page banner headlines of three financial
newspapers, the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore to examine the influence of bad
news both on stock market volatility and dynamic correlation. Our results show that the press and
markets influenced each other in generating market volatility and in particular, that the Wall Street
Journal had a crucial effect both on the volatility and correlation between the US and foreign markets.
We also found significant differences between newspapers in their interpretation of the crisis, with the
Financial Times being significantly pessimistic even in phases of low market volatility. Our results
confirm the reflexive nature of stock markets. When the situation is uncertain and unpredictable, market
behaviour may even reflect qualitative, big picture, and subjective information such as streamers in a
newspaper, whose economic and informative value is questionable.
Keywords: 2008/2009 financial crisis; financial press; bad news; market volatility; dynamic correlation;
Wall Street Journal; pessimism.
Introduction
Global financial crises have always followed similar patterns throughout history (e.g., [1]), including the
crucial role of financial press (e.g., [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]). From the bursting of the Tulip buble in 1637 in the
Netherlands to the dot.com bubble in 2001 in America, the financial press has significantly influenced
the stock market, often amplifying the cognitive bias and herd behaviour of investors (e.g., [6]; [7]).
This behaviour may depend on the strong sensitivity of investors towards bad news. Recent studies
have shown that market responses to good and bad news is asymmetric. Indeed, investors are more
sensitive to negative news, especially when the market is dominated by uncertainty and unpredictability,
and this is an important source of market volatility (e.g., [8]; [9]; [10]; [11]; [12]; [13]; [14]). [15] found
that stock prices overreacted to bad news even in good times and underreacted to good news in bad
times. Similarly [16] found that bad news has a bigger impact both in phases of market expansion
and contraction. Moreover, the press may induce a “framing effect”, according to which investors react
disproportionally to negative news especially when information source is authoritative (e.g., [17]; [18];
[19]). In this case, communication research indicates that the perceived authoritativeness of news sources
implies higher trust in the news from these sources ( [20]). This effect has been empirically confirmed by
a survey on 321 traders and 63 financial journalists from leading banks and financial news providers in
the European foreign exchange market ( [21]) and a recent case-study on three Dutch banks during the
recent financial crisis ( [14]).
While the importance of these aspects has been largely underestimated in economics (e.g., [22], [23]),
they have been recently investigated in empirical finance (e.g., [24]; [25]; [26]), with interesting parallels
with recent sociological investigation on financial markets (e.g., [27]). Unlike the efficient market hypoth-
esis, these studies show that investors are largely influenced by the media, rumours and gossip even in
’normal’ market periods, where prices should contain all necessary information (e.g., [24]; [28]). If this
is so, we would expect that, in times of financial crisis such as the 2008-2009 period, not only would
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investors to overestimate the relevance of not strictly economic, general information. Indeed, in these
situations, market prices and other relevant quantitative data on markets are even more variedly inter-
preted by investors than in normal periods ( [27]). Even qualitative, big picture, subjective information,
such as streamers in a newspaper, can become relevant in these cases.
To look at this, we investigated the relationship between negative news in financial newspapers and
volatility and correlation between stock markets during the recent global financial crisis. We analysed
one year of front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal,
Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009, when the recent
financial crisis exploded globally. We created an index of bad news per newspaper on a daily base and
studied the relation between this index and the closing values of three stock market indexes, such as the
DowJones, FTSE and MIB. We considered these stock markets as they were more domestically affected
by these newspapers, while comparing their dynamics was essential to look at equivalences and differences
across markets and between different press cultures.
Our work has important differences compared with previous work. First, unlike previous studies in
empirical finance (e.g., [25]), we focused on the last financial crisis as we wanted to better understand the
fabric of pessimism that dominated the last years worldwide. Secondly, rather than considering specific
market information, as reported in specialized columns, we looked at the impact of general information
provided by front page headlines of the financial press. Indeed, front page headlines are crucial in
summarizing the meaning, tone and importance of the news but are not expected to contain true, precise
and detailed information about economic facts, unlike specialized columns. This is because: (i) headline
information is too succinct and (ii) front page messages heavily reflect specific information strategies of
the newspapers, which are mainly concerned with impressing and attracting the reader. Furthermore,
unlike [24], we did not restrict our interest to strictly speaking financial news but considered economic
information in general. Unlike [29] and [25], we did not focus on precise information concerned with
specific stocks but rather looked at general information, which reflects more interpretation than objective
details. Thirdly, while studies on the impact of social media on stock markets have recently been carried
out that focus on similar crisis periods (e.g., [30]; [31]), our idea was that, in a situation of financial
turmoil, the authoritative columns of certain influential financial newspapers and so also traditional
media could have a strong impact on the investors’ mood. Finally, by comparing three newspapers and
their respective stock markets, we also wanted to measure differences in interpretation of this global crisis
and consider certain country-specific cultural features of the press (e.g., [32]).
To our knowledge, this is the first work that extends the analysis of the impact of financial press
from market volatility to market correlation. Combining volatility and correlation was key to: (i) under-
standing if bad news has had an effect on the growing interdependence of markets, which is presumably
correlated with crisis periods (e.g., [9]; [33]); (ii) looking at the impact of bad news not only from the
point of view of risk but also from that of risk diversification. We estimated the volatility and correla-
tion dynamics using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models (see [34])
with dynamic conditional correlation ( [35]). Secondly, we estimated the dynamic relationship between
market volatility/correlation and bad news by using vector autoregressive models (VAR). We also per-
formed a Granger-causality test to verify whether bad news time series had predictive value for market
volatility/correlation ( [36]). A strong quantitative approach to typical sociological and qualitative fac-
tors, such as investors’ mood and media pessimism, was intended to favour cross-fertilization between
empirical finance (usually addressed to quantitative facts, but was little concerned with sociological as-
pects) and sociology of financial markets (strongly concerned with sociological aspects of markets, but
poorly interested in macro quantitative market consequences). This integration is essential to understand
complex institutional, socio-economic artefacts, such as financial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 illustrates the background and our research
hypotheses. Sect. 3 presents our dataset and illustrates the bad news index that we used to measure the
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Sect. 4 introduces the model we built to examine the impact of newspapers on markets. Sect. 5 focuses
on causal statistical relationships between the press and markets. Sect. 6 provides a robustness and
sensitivity analysis, while the last Sect. summarizes our main findings and discusses certain limitations.
Background and Hypotheses
Many studies in finance have shown that stock market prices incorporate financial press information
(e.g., [37]; [38]; [39]). While this may be expected in cases of quantitative information on important
economic statistics, such as those regularly released by important institutional agencies (e.g., [40]; [41];
[42]; [43], [44]; [45, 46]), it is less likely to find a positive impact of qualitative information, such as
journalists’ opinion or reports of market rumours, which is subjective ( [47]; [28]). Nevertheless, empirical
evidence is also growing in this area.
For instance, [29] examined Dartboard, a monthly column of the Wall Street Journal reporting ana-
lysts’ recommendations, from 1988 to 1990. Results showed that for the two days following the publica-
tion, average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent of the stock recommended were partially reversed
only within 25 trading days. Similarly, [25] examined Abreast of the Market, a popular column of the
Wall Street Journal, from 1984 to 1999. It is worth noting that, unlike Dartboard, which asks market
analysts’ opinions, this column is closer to entertainment than information. The author found that even
qualitative information, such as the fraction of negative words in this column, was incorporated in aggre-
gate market valuations. More specifically, results showed that high level of pessimism robustly predicted
downward pressure on market prices and that high or low values of pessimism helped to predict high
market trading volumes. More recently, [48] examined 30 years of ”Abreast of the Market” and showed
that even specific columnists can influence stock market behaviour. [49] extended this type of analysis by
addressing the impact of negative words in all Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Service stories
about individual S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2004. Results showed that negative words in the financial
press forecasted low firm earnings and that stock market prices incorporated the information embedded
in negative words only with a slight delay. This would confirm that bad news is assimilated faster than
good ones in market behaviour (e.g., [9]).
Other studies showed that this effect was even true for unconventional, un-specialized media, whose
information should be less relevant for investors. For example, [24] examined the effect of more than
1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull about 45 companies in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index, by measuring bullishness. They found that stock
messages helped to predict market volatility both on a daily base and also within the same trading day.
More specifically, they found that higher message postings predicted negative subsequent returns. They
also found that disagreement between the posted messages was associated with increased trading volume.
More recently, [31] found that Twitter mood predicted more than 80% of daily volatility of closing values
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. This would confirm Nofsinger’s argument that social mood may
cause an increase of decisions biased by optimism or pessimism that could considerably influence aggregate
investment and business activity, even reflecting future economic activities ( [50]).
The idea that markets are influenced by reflexivity mechanisms has been explained by recent soci-
ological investigation, which has mostly examined trading activities in specific organizational contexts
(e.g., [51]; [23], [52]; [27]). Unfortunately, these studies underestimated the importance of understanding
how context-specific empirical cases could result in aggregate quantitative market data. Our aim was
to fill this gap by formulating and empirically testing certain hypotheses on the influence of press infor-
mation on stock market behaviour comparatively, so as to consider possible institutional diversity in the
relation between financial press and markets.
Our research hypotheses were as follows. First, [11] and [28] showed that investors, even those following
long-term strategies, are more influenced by negative news as they reduce the difficulty in predicting future
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also found in experimental and economic psychology (e.g., [22]). Our hypothesis is that the importance
of these psychological factors could dramatically increase during financial turmoil as investors tend to
disqualify the reliability of prices and even the well-functioning of the markets and are more sensitive
to other sources of information, including newspaper headlines. Indeed, the fact that information is
subject to profit maximisation by newspapers should make investors cautious of these sources ( [53]).
Furthermore, unlike efficient market hypothesis, experimental research has shown that, in uncertainty,
investors tend to overestimate their informational gap and are sensitive to any additional information,
including subjective one (e.g., [54]). Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) is that bad news published by
financial newspapers could negatively influence the daily volatility of financial markets during this period.
Secondly, although most financial crises have had an international impact in the past, the 2008-
2009 crisis was truly global as financial markets are now extremely interdependent. Indeed, modern
investment technologies allow investors to make millions of operations per time unit, at any time and
anywhere (e.g., [55]). In this situation, we expect that the pessimistic messages of financial newspapers
could explain not only market volatility but also dependence between stock markets. Numerous previous
studies showed that market interdependence tends to be highly correlated with periods of volatility
(e.g., [56]; [22]). For instance, [9] and [33] suggested that in periods of crisis and high market volatility,
covariation could even include markets that do not have much in common. [57] suggested that this trend
has intensified especially recently with increasing globalization of investment strategies. Our hypothesis
(H2) is that in periods of turmoil, bad news could even influence market correlation and has an impact
on global investment strategies. Coherently, we expected that in this period the interplay of financial
markets and the press could determine a cascade of pessimism that co-influences both information and
market behaviour (H3) (e.g., [58]).
Data
The Bad News Index
Our dataset includes one year of front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, namely the
Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and Il Sole24ore, on a daily base. For technical constraints, i.e.,
the unavailability of fully accessible electronic editions or lack of front page news included in electronic
versions, we collected data manually on printed versions of the newspapers. Budget, time and linguistic
constraints did not permit us to consider other national newspapers or cover longer time periods. The
dataset and a text file, including a full description of the variables, are available as supplementary
information. We analysed any front page banner headline from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009
which conveyed news on the crisis (not only those expressly related to financial markets) by measuring
the emphasis and the tone of the message. The emphasis was measured by counting the number of banner
columns reporting an economic news compared with the total number of potentially available columns,
according to standard newspaper layout. We assumed that the higher the percentage of columns assigned
to the banner headline, the stronger the emphasis of the message was. The tone was measured by counting
the ratio of negative words over the total words used in the headline text (all included, also verbs and
conjunctions), such as “recession”, “fear” and so on. We assumed that the higher was the number of
negative words in the text, the stronger the pessimism of the message was. For the sake of simplicity, we
did not distinguish the degree of pessimism by raking the words used.
Our bad news index was based on three types of information. We considered the number of negative
banner headlines on the crisis, Lk,t, the number of columns, Ck,t, where news were reported, and the
number of negative words reported in the text, Nk,t, at time t for each journal k = F,W, S, where F
stands for Financial Times, W for Wall Street Journal, and S for IlSole24ore. It is worth noting that
the time index t refers to open-trading days, so time t = 1, . . . 250 days. The information from the press
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day. The index was build as follows. Let Tk,t be the maximum number of available columns for a banner
headline in the newspaper, then the relative importance index was
wk,t =
Ck,t
Lk,t
(1)
k = F,W, S and t = 1, . . . , T . Then the journal-specific bad news index, Bk,t, at time t for the journal k,
was defined as
Bk,t = wk,t(Tk,t(1 +Nk,t)) (2)
for k = F,W, S and t = 1, . . . , T .
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the bad new index per newspaper. The vertical dashed lines correspond to certain peaks
of bad news. The first peak was on 16th September 2008, the day before it was announced that Lehman
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, Merrill Lynch agreed to be sold to Bank of America
for 50 billion dollars and estimates said that up to 50.000 jobs were at risk. The second peak was on 24th
October 2008 after the Congressional hearing where Alan Greenspan admitted that he had put too much
faith in the self-correcting power of markets. A third peak was on 6th April 2009, involving especially
the Financial Times, when the Geithner plan to buy toxic assets was strongly criticised as a means to
provide government “cash for trash” and UK analysts started to forecast that stagflation was around the
corner.
If we consider bad news dynamics, our one-year sample could be approximately divided into two
sub-samples, i.e., an initial period characterized by higher concentration of bad news, and a second one
after spring 2009, where bad news were generally less frequent. By comparing the three newspapers, it
is evident that the Wall Street Journal was more cautious and the Financial Times published bad news
more frequently, also for the second sub-sample.
Tab. 1 shows mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the bad news index per newspaper.
Looking at the mean value of the bad index, it is worth noting that the Financial Times was more
pessimistic than the other newspapers. On the other hand, if we consider the deviation from the mean
(skewness) and the extreme values (kurtosis), Il Sole24Ore showed higher excess pessimism. The Wall
Street Journal was more cautious throughout the entire sample, i.e., it showed both lower means and
volatility.
We then distinguished two sub-samples, the first from 1st September 2008 to 30th March 2009, where
the market volatility was considerably higher, the second from 31st March 2009 to 1st September 2009,
with less volatility. Data showed that pessimism was generally higher in the first sub-sample. The
Financial Times and Wall Street Journal showed a similar level of excess pessimism, which was lower
than Il Sole24Ore. In the second sub-sample, where market volatility was lower, the Financial Times
showed both higher levels of pessimism and excess pessimism. This meant that the Financial Times
followed a more critical stance on the crisis, by reporting bad news even in periods of relatively lower
market volatility.
Our database also included the names and amount of journalists who authored any front page leading
article on the crisis. We calculated a Gini index that measured the concentration of articles per journalist.
Not only did the Financial Times concentrate more articles with a few journalists (WSJ index took 0.61,
while FT took 0.66), it did so especially in the low market volatility period (WSJ index for the second
sub-sample took 0.68, while FT took 0.77). This meant that the stronger critical stance of Financial
Times in times of lower market volatility was due to a few critical journalists (see more detailed analysis
in Sect. 6).
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the U.S. and UK financial press (e.g., [59]). [60] has argued that the higher pessimism of the Financial
Times in reflecting the 2008/2009 crisis depended on a mixture of history and contingency (see also [61]).
On the one hand, while the Wall Street Journal has been historically more devoted to investigation,
addressed to an investor readership and focused on domestic affairs, the Financial Times has always been
more concerned with economic theory and interpretation and mainly focused on international affairs. This
could explain the stronger sensitivity of the British newspaper towards a general outlook of the crisis (e.g.,
the implications of the financial crisis for the real economy) and its stronger focus on commentaries and
academic debate. Even the tendency to blame U.S. market responsibility and critically discuss the U.S.
political agenda against the crisis could explain the stronger sensitivity of the Financial Times towards
the development of the crisis (see also [62]). It is worth noting that more than 80% of Financial Times
front pages in the period considered included an article or commentary on the crisis, against 67% of Wall
Street Journal.
On the other hand, the stronger concern for home investors could have lead the Wall Street Journal
to follow a less critical stance and be more cautious in spreading bad news. In a recent story on the U.S.
press coverage of the financial crisis, [63] suggested that American journalists were extremely cautious
in reporting bad news as it was clear that, in a situation of market unpredictability and turmoil, any
influential opinion or streamer could have had a dramatic influence on market behaviour.
Secondly, it is worth noting that after the dramatic events of September/October 2008, the financial
press in the UK was strongly criticized for boosterism and excessive embeddedness. [60] explained that,
in the autumn of 2008, a turning point was achieved in the relationship between press and markets,
epitomized especially by the Financial Times. This was called the “media’s moral compass” to mean
that the relationship between the press and the market shifted from a “cozy co-dependence” to a more
critical stance. This would explain why the Financial Times suggested a pessimistic interpretation of
economic events.
The next step was to calculate the correlation between newspapers (see Tab. 1). Results showed
that newspaper pessimism was significantly positively correlated. The more positive correlations were
between the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times, and between the Wall Street Journal and Il
Sole24ore. If we consider the difference between periods of high and low market volatility, it is worth
noting that the higher correlation was in high volatility periods between Wall Street Journal and Financial
Times, whereas correlations were not-significant or negative in periods of low volatility. This meant
that in periods of higher market volatility, differences between Wall Street Journal and Financial Times
drastically diminished. Indeed, in this period, these two leading newspapers basically conformed both in
terms of timing and intensity of pessimism. On the other hand, significant differences persisted for other
periods, where market volatility was less pronounced.
Market Volatility and Correlation
Let Xi,t indicate the log-return at time t for FTSE (i = UK), DowJones (i = US) and MIB (i = IT ),
the three stock market financial indexes to which the three newspapers refer more frequently. Let us
calculate their volatility and correlation dynamics by means of a generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH ) model (see [34]; [64]) with dynamic conditional correlation (see also [35]).
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Si,t =
1− λ
1− λτ
τ−1∑
k=0
λk(Xi,t−k − X¯i,t)
2 (3)
Sij,t =
1− λ
1− λτ
τ−1∑
k=0
λk(Xi,t−k − X¯i,t)(Xj,t−k − X¯j,t) (4)
Rij,t =
Sij,t√
Si,t
√
Sj,t
(5)
for i, j = US,UK, IT where X¯i,t was the empirical average overXi,t−τ+1, . . . , Xi,t, λ > 0 was a smoothing
factor and τ > 0 was a forgetting factor.
Fig. 2 shows the results of our non-parametric estimation procedure. The first row shows the log-
returns of the FTSE, DowJones and MIB market indexes at a daily base for closing values. The graphs
in the second row show the level of log-volatility (i.e. logSi,t) for each index. Although we did not report
data before 1st September 2008, it is worth noting that market volatility significantly increased after
September 2008. This is evident when looking at the beginning of our sample (see the graphs in the
second row of Fig. 2). It is worth clarifying that this was not due to a lack of data in the estimates at
the beginning of the sample. Indeed, the first estimate of the volatility was calculated starting from a
window of 60 initial observations, which were not represented in the first row of Fig. 2. This means that
our sample fully reflected a period of significant market turmoil. Results showed that market dynamics
were similar. More specifically, while the level of volatility was similar at the beginning, at the end of the
sample the Italian market showed higher log-volatility than the UK and U.S. stock markets. Furthermore,
the level of correlation between the three market indexes increased after September 2008 to quickly reach
0.6 for DowJones and FTSE, 0.7 for MIB and DowJones and 0.9 for MIB and FTSE. Secondly, our results
showed that the correlation between these three markets was positive. If we look at values before and
after the beginning of the period under observation, it is worth noting that the UK and Italian markets
were more highly dependent than the U.S. and UK and U.S. and Italy respectively.
These results confirm certain previous empirical findings on the higher correlation between markets
during a financial crisis (e.g., [65]; [66]), especially in periods of higher volatility of the U.S. stock markets
( [67]). Secondly, they would confirm recent findings on the increasing interdependence of European stock
markets ( [68]).
Analysis
Let Vt = (logSUS,t, logSUK,t, logSIT,t)
′ be the vector of log-volatilities and Zt = (ϕ(SUS,UK,t), ϕ(SUS,IT,t),
ϕ(SUK,IT,t))
′, with ϕ(x) = log(1− x)− log(1+ x), the vector of logistic-transformed correlations. Let us
define Mt = (V
′
t , Z
′
t)
′. We examined the relationship between bad news and the variance and correlation
of the three financial indexes. We considered static models as follows:
Mi,t = νi + ψi,FBF,t + ψi,WBW,t + ψi,SBS,t + εi,t (6)
with i = 1, . . . , 6, and εi,t ∼ N (0, ξ
2
i ) i.i.d. ∀t, i.
Table 2 shows that all bad news coefficients were positive. This means the any increase of pessimism
by newspapers had a positive impact on the volatility of markets. Obviously, the impact was not the
same for each newspaper or market. The Wall Street Journal had a strong impact on all markets. The
bad news of Wall Street Journal and Financial Times had a significant impact (at 5% significance) on
the simultaneous level of log-volatility in all markets (see the left panel in Tab. 2). Finally, Il Sole24Ore
bad news influenced the volatility of the UK and Italian stock markets.
8As regards to market correlation, it is worth noting that Wall Street Journal’s pessimism had a
significant impact on all correlations. Vice-versa, the Financial Times and Il Sole24Ore had an impact
only on their respective markets (see the right panel of Tab. 2). This would confirm the leadership of
Wall Street Journal in influencing the stock market and its worldwide impact. On the other hand, it is
interesting to note that any increase of pessimism by the Wall Street Journal had a negative impact on
the correlation between UK and Italian markets. This could be explained by the fact that the Wall Street
Journal mainly focused on domestic affairs and negative news on the U.S. stock market could have lead
investors to move their investments towards other markets or in general to explore a variety of investment
strategies. This could have contributed to generate heterogeneity in stock market behaviour globally.
Statistical Causal Relations
To look at the causes of statistical relationships in more detail, we performed a Granger-causality test that
examined the lagged dependence structure between bad news and market correlation and volatility. This
allowed us to verify whether bad news had any predictive value for market volatility and correlation. We
considered each possible dependence between markets and information, by setting Bt = (BF,t, BW,t, BS,t)
and considering VAR models.
Volatility
A joint test on the statistical causal relationships of volatility and pessimism was based on the following
VAR model of dimension 6 and order p:
Vt = Ψ10 +
p∑
j=1
(Ψ11,jVt−j +Ψ12,jBt−j) + ε1,t (7)
Bt = Ψ20 +
p∑
j=1
(Ψ21,jVt−j +Ψ22,jBt−j) + ε2,t (8)
with (ε1,t, ε2,t) ∼ N6(O6,Ξ) i.i.d. ∀t, Ψ
′
10 = (ψUS , ψUK , ψIT ) and Ψ
′
20 = (ψF , ψW , ψS) were the intercept
and the 3-dimensional square matrices Ψ11,j , Ψ12,j , Ψ21,j , Ψ22,j, were the autoregressive coefficients of
the VAR6(p) model.
In order to disentangle the relation between volatility and the press, we first looked at the statistical
significance of the relationship between volatility at time t and news at time t−k, which depended on the
matrices Ψ12,k, k = 1, . . . , p with elements ψ
12,k
ij , i = US,UK, IT and j = F,W, S. Then, we looked at
the relation between bad news at time t and volatility at time t− k, which depended on elements ψ12,kij ,
i = F,W, S and j = US,UK, IT of the matrices Ψ21,k, k = 1, . . . , p. For our purpose and for the sake
of simplification, we have included only a subset of the VAR coefficients, i.e., the elements of Ψ12,1 and
Ψ21,1 only for the first lag (see Table 3).
Results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news (lagged by one period) significantly increased the
volatility of the three market indexes in the subsequent period (see the left panel in Tab. 3). This is
further confirmation of the leadership of this newspaper and its worldwide impact. The bad news of other
newspapers did not have any significant impact on market volatility, with the exception of the lagged
relation between Il Sole24Ore bad news and the volatility of the U.S. market. Considering the effect of
market volatility on bad news, it is worth noting that the FTSE volatility had a significant and positive
impact on the bad news of each newspaper (see the right panel in Tab. 3). This would confirm the recent
worldwide importance of the London stock market. Finally, it is worth noting that the volatility of the
Dow Jones index had a significant and negative impact on Il Sole24ore bad news.
9We tested the hypothesis that volatility did not jointly statistically cause, in a Granger sense, the
bad-news indexes. To look at the causal relationship between each market-specific volatility and the
three newspapers, we also tested separately the hypothesis that neither each one of the three bad-news
indexes, nor all three indexes jointly considered statistically caused, in a Granger sense, the market-
specific volatility. To look at the relationship between each newspaper and the three markets, we did the
same for newspaper bad news.
Tab. 4 shows the results of these joint and pairwise tests. First, the p-value of the joint test in the
last column and last row, in the left panel, indicates that newspaper bad news was fully caused by market
turmoil. Therefore, stock market behaviour was the essential source of bad news and newspapers did not
have unrealistically pessimistic stances. Secondly, if we look at the p-values of almost all the pairwise
causality tests (see the left panel), this statistical causality direction from markets to newspapers was
true for all log-volatility and bad news indexes. On the other hand, if we look at the p-values in the
last column, last row in the right panel, we should conclude that, in general, the financial press did not
determine market volatility. More specifically, results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news alone
had a strong statistical, causal impact on market volatility (see the first row in the right panel). Generally
speaking, we could not predict market volatility only by looking at financial press bad news.
Correlations
The VAR model of order q for bad-news indexes and correlations was as follows:
Ct = Φ10 +
q∑
j=1
(Φ11,jCt−j +Φ12,jBt−j) + η1,t (9)
Bt = Φ20 +
q∑
j=1
(Φ21,jCt−j +Φ22,jBt−j) + η2,t (10)
with (η1,t, η2,t) ∼ N6(O6,Σ) i.i.d. ∀t, where Φ10 = (φUS , φUK , φIT ) and Φ20 = (φF , φW , φS) were the
intercept and Φij,k, i, j = 1, 2 k = 1, . . . , q, were the autoregressive coefficients of the V AR6(1) model.
We examined the statistical significance of the relationship between correlation at time t and bad news
at time t− 1, which was given by the matrix Φ12,k with elements φ
12,k
ij , i = US−UK,US− IT, UK− IT
and j = F,W, S. Then, we also looked at the relationship between bad news at time t and correlation at
time t− 1, which was given by the elements φ21,kij , i = F,W, S and j = US − UK,US − IT, UK − IT of
the matrix Φ21,k. Note that, for the shortage of space, we included only the autoregressive coefficients at
the first lag, not all the estimated coefficients of the VAR models (see Table 5).
Our results (see Table 5, left column) showed that Wall Street Journal bad news (one lag) had a
negative impact on the correlation between U.S. and UK stock markets. Indeed, bad news in the Wall
Street Journal reduced the co-movement of these markets. This could be explained in terms of outflow of
capital from the U.S. stock market and inflow into the UK market. On the other hand, Financial Times
bad news (one lag) had no significant impact on market correlations. Il Sole24ore bad news decreased
the correlation between the U.S. and Italian stock markets. The same explanation is a possible reason.
In addition, results (see Table 5, right column) showed that Wall Street Journal bad news reflected all
one lag correlations. An increase in the correlation between the U.S. and UK stock markets decreased the
journal’s pessimism, whereas an increase in the U.S.-IT and UK-IT correlations increased it. Furthermore,
higher (one lag) correlation between the UK and Italian stock markets increased the pessimism of the
Financial Times. Finally, all correlations had a significant impact on Il Sole24Ore, similar to the Wall
Street Journal.
We performed a joint and pairwise Granger causality test to rigorously asses the presence of causal
relationships, as we did for log-volatility. The last column, last row in the left panel of tab. 6 shows that
all correlations had a Granger causal effect on all bad news indexes. More specifically, while U.S.-IT stock
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market correlation did not statistically cause the bad news index, UK-IT and U.S.-UK correlations had
a Granger causal effect on the bad news indexes of Financial Times and Il Sole24ore. Secondly, looking
at the last column, last row of the right panel, we can see that the joint test did not reject the null
hypothesis of the absence of Granger causality between all bad news and correlation indexes. Finally,
results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news determined U.S.-IT and U.S.-UK market correlation
but not that of UK-IT.
Therefore, any bad news in the Wall Street Journal predicted correlation between the U.S. and the
other stock markets. Following certain peculiarities of Wall Street Journal as discussed in Sect 3 (see
Table 2), such as its worldwide recognized leadership and strong focus on domestic affairs, this meant
that investors considered any bad news published in this influential newspaper as a good prediction of
market behaviour and promptly reacted by drastically modifying their global investment strategies.
To sum up, we can say that results corroborated the first hypothesis (H1), i.e., bad news published in
the newspapers’ banner headlines had a significant influence on market volatility. More specifically, we
found that Wall Street Journal alone contributed to market volatility. At the same time, our findings also
corroborated the second hypothesis (H2), which argued that bad news could even influence the correlation
of markets. More specifically, we found that the Wall Street Journal had a significant impact on market
correlation, although different for different markets involved and directions. H3 was not fully confirmed
as it claimed that, in period of financial turmoil, the press and markets influenced each other, possibly
contributing to a cascade of pessimism. We found that market correlation and newspapers exerted mutual
influence only in specific cases. In particular, our results showed that the Wall Street Journal strongly
predicted market correlation and volatility.
Our findings confirm the sociological argument of the reflexive nature of stock markets. We found
that media and markets are so systematically related to extend this reflexivity also to qualitative, subjec-
tive, broad picture information sources, whose true economic value should be seriously questioned from
a mainstream, ’efficient market hypothesis’ approach. On the other hand, especially if we look at the
stronger influence of Wall Street Journal, we can argue against the common sense belief that newspa-
pers would have over-exaggerated the dramatic events of 2008/2009 by imposing a critical stance which
contributed to a cascade and contagion of pessimism. .
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In order to corroborate our findings better, we performed further statistical tests to verify if certain
specificities of market behaviour, such as downturn or upturn phases, could have had a consequence on
the predictive power of the bad news index on market volatility and correlation. To do so, we re-estimated
the VAR models for volatility and correlation described in the previous section by using alternatively the
lowest and the highest returns of each trading day in the calculation of volatility and correlation. This
was to estimate the impact of bad news on more point-to-point market behaviour, where it is less likely
that stock markets fully reverberated all potential effects of a bad news.
Table 7 shows that Wall Street Journal bad news had a significant impact on extreme returns (see
High and Low columns), so confirming previous findings. Furthermore, results showed that the Wall
Street Journal not only had a significant effect on the U.S.-UK market correlation, but also on other
correlations. On the other hand, the effect of market correlation on the Wall Street Journal bad news
was more significant for closing returns than for low and high returns. This meant that the higher the
correlation between markets, especially between the U.S. and UK markets, the lower the bad news index
of the Wall Street Journal was. The situation with the Financial Times was different. In this case, the
effect of correlation for low and high returns were statistically stronger than that of closing returns. Il
Sole24ore showed weak correlation effects in these downturn and upturn cases. It is important to note
that the FTSE-MIB correlation had a strong effect on the Il Sole24ore bad news independent of the type
of market phases.
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We then examined the robustness of the results on the choice of the smoothing λ factor in the
estimation of the volatility and correlation. Lower values of λ corresponded to higher weights for the
most recent observations in the window considered. This leads to volatility and correlation that were
more sensitive to large variations in returns. Thus, we verified whether these results survived to the
inclusion of a higher level of noise in the estimation of variance and correlation. Table 8 shows that Wall
Street Journal bad news index was significant for the DJ-FTSE correlation as in previous analysis, but
that it was also significant for DJ-MIB correlation. It is worth noting that, in this case, the Financial
Times became statistically significant for FTSE-MIB correlation.
We also investigated the case of the Financial Times better, trying to understand especially whether
the relationship between its bad news and stock market was influenced by a small number of critical
journalists. First, we distinguished two bad news indexes, the first, BFC,t, for the group of central
journalists and the second, BFNC,t, for the residual group (non-central journalists). We assumed that a
journalist was central when he/she wrote more than nine commentaries in periods of high newspaper’s
pessimism. We defined a period of high pessimism whenever the Financial times bad news index was
higher than two. These criteria gave us nine central Financial Times journalists, such as Krishna Guha,
Francesco Guerrera (now at the Wall Street Journal), and Ralph Atkins among others.
Fig. 3 shows that the two indexes for the two groups had different dynamics and often moved in
opposite directions leading to a negative correlation -0.2305 (statistically significant at the 5% level). We
then considered Vt = (logSUS,t, logSUK,t, logSIT,t)
′ and Zt = (ϕ(SUS,UK,t), ϕ(SUS,IT,t), ϕ(SUK,IT,t))
′,
with ϕ(x) = log(1 − x)− log(1 + x) and Mt = (V
′
t , Z
′
t)
′ as in the previous sections and estimated
Mi,t = νi + ψi,FCBFC,t + ψi,FNCBFNC,t + ψi,WBW,t + ψi,SBS,t + εi,t (11)
with i = 1, . . . , 6, and εi,t ∼ N (0, ξ
2
i ) i.i.d. ∀t, i.
Table 9 shows that the bad news index of the group of central journalists had a significant impact
(at the 5% significance level) on the contemporaneous level of log-volatility in all markets (see the left
panel). On the contrary, there was no relationship between the pessimism of non-central journalists and
market volatility and correlation. This could indicate that the opinion of certain influential commentators
was more considered by the market and revealed a specific strategy of the newspaper, i.e., to assign
commentaries to more critical journalists in specific phases of the crisis.
Discussion
In an interesting personal account on 2008/2009 events, Peter S. Goodman, now executive business editor
of the Huffington Post, past national correspondent for the New Work Times, reported that:
“Inside our newsroom in midtown Manhattan, we understood that were were not merely
passive chroniclers of external events. The sportswriter can describe what is happening
on the field from a dispassionate distance, without imagining that the words he types
may somehow influence the events he is witnessing. Not so for those of us writing about
the financial crisis: were were effectively on the field while the game was still under
way. Investors and markets and ordinary people would move their money in reaction to
what we and other major media were reporting, and this would in turn affect the policy
climate, the perception of need for emergency measures, the politics of the debate over
those measures, and the public mood, which then reverberated back on everything else“
( [63], p. 110).
This personal view testifies to the reflexive nature of markets and the limitation of the mantra of
the market efficiency hypothesis. Our findings showed that the idea of reflexivity may contemplate
that, in periods of crisis and market unpredictability, even distant information, subjective opinion and
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economically irrelevant facts may influence market behaviour. Probably, this is due to the fact that today
economic, information, technological, and social systems are more strongly and globally coupled than in
the past. This means that investors cannot easily predict future outcomes and tend to extend their social
reflexivity towards non-operational, non strictly market related events and processes, e.g., by considering
that general events, board picture information and the opinion of influential newspapers might have an
informative value for markets.
This findings has interesting implications for the financial press. Indeed, following Goodman’s argu-
ment, a competent, reliable and responsible information is crucial for markets to work well, especially
in periods of financial turmoil. This means that it is important to carry out more serious investigation
on the ethics and responsibility of the financial press to establish new standards of conduct and better
incentives and sanctions to support reliable information (e.g., [61]; [14]). Secondly, our findings showed
that the increasing globalization of financial markets and their correlation in times of crisis require the
press to truly cover the international dimension of business and be less parochial. This challenges the
quality of the press coverage of global market dynamics and indicates the need for improving the public
understanding of the intricate mechanisms of stock markets.
Finally, certain limitations of our work should be considered. First, we did not study the influence
of the financial press on stock markets but only that of bad news. This gave us a narrow view of
the link between the press and markets. Secondly, we studied the relationship of the financial press
and stock markets in an “abnormal“ market phase, where market behaviour was strongly subjected to
irrational expectation and social mood. We intentionally selected this period as we expected that, in
these situations, the pessimism of the financial press and its cross-sectoral dynamics could help us to
understand the crisis better. While our results do not contribute to a general theory of the link of press
and markets, they can provide important insights to understand the ’social construction’ of pessimism
between press and markets.
Moreover, it is also important to note that press pessimism and market behaviour could also be
conditioned by other media, such as the new social media and the Internet (e.g., [31]). Comparing
behaviour and impact of various media would be essential to provide a more precise analysis of the
2008/2009 crisis and draw more general remarks of the complex ways through which market sentiment
tends to form today (e.g., see [30]). The same holds for the idea of including other newspapers and
markets, which may help us to have a more complete picture of the recent crisis and its global dimension.
Supporting Information
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Excel file reporting the newspaper data used for the construction of the bad news indexes.
Description S2.
Text file with a description of the dataset.
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Figure 1. Bad news index per newspaper (in rows) from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009 on
a daily base. Peaks of bad news are indicated with vertical dashed lines.
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Figure 2. Daily log-returns (first row) of the FTSE, DowJones and MIB indexes from 1st September
2008 to 1st September 2009. Daily log-volatilities (second row) and correlations (third row), evaluated
sequentially over time with a rolling window of τ = 60 observations and a smoothing factor λ = 0.99. In
the last row, the red lines indicate the 95% confidence band about the estimated correlations.
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Figure 3. Financial Times bad news index per group of journalists from 1st September 2008 to 1st
September 2009 on a daily base: central journalists are in black solid lines, non-central journalists are in
blue dashed lines. Peaks of bad news are indicated with vertical dashed lines.
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Tables
Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt.
W 0.82 1.07 1.69 6.41 1.09 1.22 1.30 4.74 0.42 0.61 1.47 4.64
F 1.98 2.49 2.73 15.86 2.38 2.22 1.10 3.67 1.40 2.78 4.39 26.79
S 1.17 2.31 4.12 27.41 1.60 2.76 3.56 20.33 0.55 1.19 2.84 11.85
Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
W F S W F S W F S
W 1.00∗ 0.19∗ 0.13∗ 1.00∗ 0.20∗ 0.08 1.00∗ 0.03 -0.06
F 1.00∗ 0.11∗ 1.00∗ 0.06 1.00∗ 0.13
S 1.00∗ 1.00∗ 1.00∗
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the bad news index. First panel: mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis. Second panel: correlation between indexes. The symbol ”*” indicates that the null
hypothesis of zero valued Pearson’s correlation was rejected at the 5% significance level.
Impact on volatilities
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US
ν1 -7.6856 -192.1191 0.0000 *
ψ1,W 0.1332 4.6755 0.0001 *
ψ1,F 0.0266 2.8681 0.0044 *
ψ1,S 0.0354 2.8001 0.0551
UK
ν2 -7.7634 -202.5992 0.0000 *
ψ2,W 0.1198 5.0512 0.0001 *
ψ2,F 0.0323 3.1772 0.0017 *
ψ2,S 0.0395 3.2643 0.0012 *
IT
ν3 -7.4971 -236.6942 0.0000 *
ψ3,W 0.0731 3.7321 0.0002 *
ψ3,F 0.0234 2.7753 0.0059 *
ψ3,S 0.0301 2.9962 0.0031 *
Impact on correlations
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US-IT
ν4 0.5818 39.6552 0.0000 *
ψ4,W -0.0161 -1.7674 0.0119 *
ψ4,F -0.0011 -0.2851 0.7762
ψ4,S -0.0028 -0.5983 0.5502
UK-IT
ν5 0.8334 122.7822 0.0000
ψ5,W 0.0108 2.5831 0.0104 *
ψ5,F 0.0037 2.0676 0.0398 *
ψ5,S 0.0048 2.0397 0.0225 *
UK-US
ν6 0.5862 38.0473 0.0000 *
ψ6,W -0.0206 -2.1631 0.0212 *
ψ6,F 0.0021 0.5152 0.6068
ψ6,S -0.0020 -0.4141 0.6790
Table 2. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes on volatility. Right: the effect of the bad news
indexes on correlations. Columns: the parameter θ (first), estimates θˆ (second), value of the t-statistics
(third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘ indicates significance of the parameter at the 5%
significance level (last).
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Impact on volatilities
θ Ψˆ12,1 t-stat p-val
US
ψ
12,1
US,W 0.0093 3.1230 0.0020 *
ψ
12,1
US,F 0.0002 0.1692 0.8663
ψ
12,1
US,S -0.0033 -2.3871 0.0177 *
UK
ψ
12,1
UK,W 0.0076 2.2512 0.0253 *
ψ
12,1
UK,F 0.0002 0.1679 0.8676
ψ
12,1
UK,S -0.0019 -1.1534 0.2501
IT
ψ
12,1
IT,W 0.0073 2.1151 0.0354 *
ψ
12,1
IT,F 0.0004 0.3061 0.7602
ψ
12,1
IT,S -0.0023 -1.455 0 0.1469
Impact on newspapers
θ Ψˆ21,1 t-stat p-val
W
ψ
21,1
W,US -0.32445 -0.4851 0.6278
ψ
21,1
W,UK 1.70194 2.4692 0.0142 *
ψ
21,1
W,IT -0.96905 -1.8552 0.0648
F
ψ
21,1
F,US -2.0504 -1.2334 0.2188
ψ
21,1
F,UK 3.56990 2.0822 0.0384 *
ψ
21,1
F,IT 0.00951 0.0072 0.9941
S
ψ
21,1
S,US,1 -2.9694 -2.1252 0.03462 *
ψ
21,1
S,UK 4.58829 3.1842 0.00164 *
ψ
21,1
S,IT 0.2066 0.1892 0.8501
Table 3. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first lag on volatility. Right: the effect of
volatility at the first lag on the bad new indexes. Columns: the parameter θ (first), estimates θˆ
(second), value of the t-statistics (third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘ indicates
significance of the parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
H0: V 9 B H0: B 9 V
US UK IT All US UK IT All
W 0.0012* 0.0036* 0.0426 0.0011* 0.0000* 0.0248* 0.0086* 0.0100*
F 0.0042* 0.0000* 0.0010* 0.0024* 0.1289 0.9817 0.8260 0.7534
S 0.0009* 0.0001* 0.0008* 0.0010* 0.4934 0.7773 0.8918 0.7251
All 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.7442 0.7573 0.7536 0.2550
Table 4. Pairwise and joint causality test p-values. The null hypotheses (H0) were as follows:
volatility (V) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial press pessimism (B) (V 9 B, left panel),
financial press did not cause volatility (B 9 V , right panel). ”All‘ indicates all variables included in the
test and ”*‘ indicates that the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
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Impact on correlations
θ Φˆ12,1 t-stat p-val
US-UK
φ
12,1
US−UK,W -0.0023 -2.3541 0.0193 *
φ
12,1
US−UK,F 0.0004 0.4882 0.6263
φ
12,1
US−UK,S 0.0016 0.7422 0.4589
US-IT
φ
12,1
US−IT,W 0.0005 0.2482 0.8044
φ
12,1
US−IT,F -0.0003 -0.2901 0.7718
φ
12,1
US−IT,S -0.0029 -2.7522 0.0064 *
UK-IT
φ
12,1
UK−IT,W 0.0001 0.1411 0.8881
φ
12,1
UK−IT,F 0.0004 1.1182 0.2646
φ
12,1
UK−IT,S -0.0005 -1.1302 0.2598
Impact on newspaper
θ Φˆ21,1 t-stat p-val
W
φ
21,1
W,US−UK -4.6537 -3.5851 0.0004 *
φ
21,1
W,US−IT 3.4669 2.8091 0.0053 *
φ
21,1
W,UK−IT 5.9194 4.0342 0.0000 *
F
φ
21,1
F,US−UK -2.3772 -0.7242 0.4700
φ
21,1
F,US−IT 1.6567 0.5301 0.5962
φ
21,1
F,UK−IT 7.4877 2.0162 0.0449 *
S
φ
21,1
S,US−UK -8.0680 -2.9283 0.0037 *
φ
21,1
S,US−IT 5.1940 1.9836 0.0485 *
φ
21,1
S,UK−IT 12.8542 4.1272 0.0000 *
Table 5. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first lag on market correlations. Right: the
effect of market correlations at the first lag on the bad new indexes. Columns: the parameter θ (first),
estimates θˆ (second), value of the t-statistics (third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘
indicates the significance of the parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
H0: C 9 B H0: B 9 C
US-IT UK-IT US-UK All US-IT UK-IT US-UK All
W 0.1017 0.0295* 0.0595 0.0001* 0.0121* 0.6951 0.0451* 0.0221*
F 0.6570 0.0100* 0.0108* 0.0223* 0.4739 0.3627 0.3627 0.6034
S 0.1026 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0001* 0.9723 0.8733 0.8733 0.4141
All 0.1455 0.0026* 0.1780 0.0066* 0.0219* 0.4631 0.0208* 0.0423*
Table 6. Pairwise and joint causality test p-values. The null hypotheses (H0) were as follows:
correlation (C) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial press pessimism (B) (C 9 B, left panel),
financial press did not cause correlation (B 9 C, right panel). ”All‘ indicates all variables are included
in the test and ”*‘ indicates the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
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Impact on correlations
θ θˆ
Close High Low
US-UK
φ
12,1
US−UK,W -0.0023 * -0.0047 * -0.0056 *
φ
12,1
US−UK,F 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0006
φ
12,1
US−UK,S 0.0016 0.001 0.0005
US-IT
φ
12,1
US−IT,W 0.0005 -0.0061 * -0.0072 *
φ
12,1
US−IT,F -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007
φ
12,1
US−IT,S -0.0029 * -0.0003 0.0003
UK-IT
φ
12,1
UK−IT,W 0.0001 0.0121 * 0.0118 *
φ
12,1
UK−IT,F 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008
φ
12,1
UK−IT,S -0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0024
Impact on newspaper
θ θˆ
Close High Low
W
φ
21,1
W,US−UK -4.6537 * -2.26757 * -2.7215 *
φ
21,1
W,US−IT 3.4669 * 1.9398 * 1.7358 *
φ
21,1
W,UK−IT 5.9194 * 3.5517 * 4.0098 *
F
φ
21,1
F,US−UK -2.3772 -4.7657 * -6.2373 *
φ
21,1
F,US−IT 1.6567 6.3302 * 5.6573 *
φ
21,1
F,UK−IT 7.4877 * 9.2883 * 11.4475 *
S
φ
21,1
S,US−UK -8.068 * -2.9451 -3.527 *
φ
21,1
S,US−IT 5.194 * 2.2545 2.3755
φ
21,1
S,UK−IT 12.8542 * 7.0939 * 8.2052 *
Table 7. Robustness analysis of the dynamic analysis for close, high and low returns.
Impact on correlations
θ θˆ
λ = 0.99 λ = 0.95 λ = 0.90
US-UK
φ
12,1
US−UK,W -0.0023 * -0.015 * -0.0242 *
φ
12,1
US−UK,F 0.0004 0.0013 0.0032
φ
12,1
US−UK,S 0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0022
US-IT
φ
12,1
US−IT,W 0.0005 -0.0175 * -0.0256 *
φ
12,1
US−IT,F -0.0003 0.001 0.0019
φ
12,1
US−IT,S -0.0029 * -0.0021 -0.0039
UK-IT
φ
12,1
UK−IT,W 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
φ
12,1
UK−IT,F 0.0004 0.0026 * 0.0047 *
φ
12,1
UK−IT,S -0.0005 0.0017 0.0034
Impact on newspaper
θ θˆ
λ = 0.99 λ = 0.95 λ = 0.90
W
φ
21,1
W,US−UK -4.6537 * -2.9682 * 1.7003 *
φ
21,1
W,US−IT 3.4669 * 0.1451 -0.5796
φ
21,1
W,UK−IT 5.9194 * 1.8159 * 1.1167 *
F
φ
21,1
F,US−UK -2.3772 -1.9593 -0.2972
φ
21,1
F,US−IT 1.6567 1.1568 -0.0351
φ
21,1
F,UK−IT 7.4877 * 6.1841 * 2.9076 *
S
φ
21,1
S,US−UK -8.068 * -0.7873 0.4785
φ
21,1
S,US−IT 5.194 * -1.3902 * -1.6124 *
φ
21,1
S,UK−IT 12.8542 * 3.63475 * 1.9182 *
Table 8. Sensitivity analysis of the impact of different choices of the smoothing λ factor on volatility
and correlation estimations.
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Impact on volatilities
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US
ν1 -7.1128 -169.9311 0.0000 *
ψ1,W 0.1284 4.7021 0.0001 *
ψ1,FC 0.0266 3.1034 0.0021 *
ψ1,FNC 0.0266 1.4692 0.1431
ψ1,S 0.0354 5.3513 0.000
UK
ν2 -7.1553 -182.3652 0.0000 *
ψ2,W 0.1127 4.4023 0.0000 *
ψ2,FC 0.0356 3.1587 0.0018 *
ψ2,FNC 0.0367 1.5176 0.1306
ψ2,S 0.0678 5.7961 0.0000 *
IT
ν3 -6.8698 -236.6942 0.0000 *
ψ3,W 0.0654 2.9420 0.0036 *
ψ3,FC 0.0273 2.7861 0.0057 *
ψ3,FNC 0.0298 1.4161 0.1515
ψ3,S 0.0509 5.0062 0.0000 *
Impact on correlations
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US-IT
ν4 0.6908 42.9045 0.0000 *
ψ4,W -0.0029 -0.2801 0.6871
ψ4,FC -0.0018 0.3921 0.6954
ψ4,FNC -0.0055 -0.5602 0.5763
ψ4,S -0.0073 -1.5322 0.1276
UK-IT
ν5 0.8347 77.1971 0.0000
ψ5,W 0.0148 2.1081 0.0104 *
ψ5,FC 0.0063 2.0330 0.0398 *
ψ5,FNC 0.0007 0.1091 0.0398
ψ5,S 0.0031 0.9532 0.0225
UK-US
ν6 0.7198 38.0473 0.0000 *
ψ6,W -0.0208 -2.0301 0.0211 *
ψ6,FC 0.0028 0.5631 0.5742
ψ6,FNC 0.0110 1.0191 0.3091
ψ6,S -0.0063 -1.2051 0.2297
Table 9. Left: the effect of the Financial Times central and non-central journalists (parameter ψi,FC ,
i = 1, . . . , 3) on volatility. Right: the effect of the Financial Times central and non-central journalists
(parameter ψi,FC , i = 4, . . . , 6) on correlations. Columns: the parameter θ (first), estimates θˆ (second),
value of the t-statistics (third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘ indicates significance of the
parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
